Newsletter-21

123 COMPETITION LAW movie theatre business have increased their market share in the past few years; whereas, small businesses with one screening room that are not in a mall, have lost their market shares. Another element that might negatively affect these small cinema businesses is the digitization pro- cess that has emerged with developing technology. The small cinema businesses that are unable to make the necessary investments because of financial constraints are likely to be eliminated from the market. In the market, apart from the increase of the influence of the chain movie theatres within malls, and the developments leading to a more vertically integrated screening market, since 2014, the MARS group has formed a vertically integrated structure that includes all of the dis- tribution and screening markets. Thus, it must not be overlooked that there is a possibility for this undertaking that has a significant market share as compared to its closest competitor, to act in a discriminatory manner to the benefit of its own movies, especially with regard to the release dates of competing movies. When the market power resulting from the high market share of the MARS group is concerned, such discriminatory behavior may lead to barriers to entry or diminish con- sumer preferences. In the last year of sector reports, it is clear that a solution must be introduced for acquisitions by the MARS group that are not subject to the Competition Authority authorization since they are below- threshold transactions. Since competitive concerns may emerge as a result of these transactions in the micro geographical markets, the most certain solution would be an amendment of Communiqué num- bered 2010/4 regarding mergers and acquisitions. From another point of view, it may be said that it would be more appropriate if, instead of an ex ante merger and acquisition supervision, and ex-post abuse of dominant position supervision is adopted. However, it is obvious that allowing undertakings with high market powers to grow through below-threshold transactions contradicts the spirit of merger and ac- quisition control.